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As recently as a few months ago, I was full of anecdotes of my own
experience with welfare and welfare reform based on years of representing
low-income clients as a legal-services lawyer and clinical teacher. Since I read
Making Ends Meet,' however, I have a new set of anecdotes, referring to the
book several times a week. In discussions with students, I point out where
Edin and Lein's findings agree (or disagree) with the students' own
observations. I repeatedly ask colleagues if they have read the book. I
reappraise my clients' work situations in terms of Edin and Lein's findings.
My colleague Kathleen Sullivan and I decided to assign the book for our
Spring Community Legal Services clinic, in which students provide legal
services to low-income people in New Haven. In short, I have acted as though
Making Ends Meet is a very important book. At the risk of courting hyperbole,
Making Ends Meet may be the most important resource we have in trying to
figure which road to take in our ongoing journey toward welfare reform.
Why is that? For one thing, welfare reform has been crippled by a
pervasive willingness among policy makers to make critical decisions without
empirical answers to basic questions. As one example, anyone who compares
the size of welfare grants with actual housing costs knows it is virtually
impossible for a welfare recipient to pay for housing without some additional
subsidy beyond the welfare grant. This discrepancy is hardly a secret; several
state courts have discussed the inability of families to obtain shelter on a
welfare rant, given that welfare grants are often lower than market-rate
housing. Yet most recipients are unsubsidized, and we have little
understanding of the questions posed by this anomaly.
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This specific area of ignorance about welfare recipients' budgeting and
survival techniques first led Kathryn Edin to the type of research that
eventually produced Making Ends Meet. While Kathryn Edin pursued her
graduate studies, Christopher Jencks, author of The Homeless4 and Edin's
mentor, 5 hired her to interview some welfare mothers he had contacted by
telephone.6 During these interviews, Jencks and Edin were struck that the
average welfare check of $370 was about the same as rent in most cities;
Jencks credits Edin with "forcing" him to examine the fact that welfare
recipients lived on $300-400 per month.7 Through their interviews, they
sought to determine how welfare families survived.
-In his foreword to Making Ends Meet, Jencks attributes lack of public
discussion about welfare recipients' inability to pay their bills to political
expediency. 9 Conservatives do not want to draw attention to the inadequacy of
welfare grants, while liberals want to avoid publicizing the likelihood that
recipients have additional, unreported income. 0 Jencks refers to this lack of
discussion as a conspiracy of silence that facilitates welfare cuts." Jencks
predicts that the recent change from AFDC to Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) will result in a significant worsening of single
mothers' economic conditions, with the likelihood that legislators will enact
new programs to help working single mothers but will not seek to replicate
AFDC-type grants to non-working mothers. 12 He concludes his forward by
considering the challenge of helping society's children in the coming age of
welfare reform, and urges that "[a]nyone who wants to approach that
challenge realistically should read Making Ends Meet."'3 He's right.
I. Welfare Reform As We Know It
During the past few years, we have seen dramatic changes in entitlement
programs at the federal, state, and local levels. With power shifting from the
federal and local governments toward the state, most states have reacted by
diminishing welfare benefits in amount, duration, and scope. 14 Even before
federal law ended welfare as we know it, the federal waiver process, originally
intended to allow states to institute innovative pro rams, was used in recent
years by states solely to restrict or limit benefits. Forty-three states were
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5. See DeParle, supra note 3, at 32.
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7. Christopher Jencks,foreword to KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How
SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LoW-WAGE WORK at xii (1997).
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9. See Jencks, supra note 7, at xii.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at xxvii.
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granted federal permission to conduct such "welfare experiments."' 16 These
waivers, generally driven by efforts to contain costs, were granted with little
scrutiny by the Department of Health and Human Services. 17 And, of course, a
few months ago new federal le§islation dramatically limiting welfare benefits
took effect all over the country.
The result of this recent legislation is, depending on the news source of
choice, either a stunning success or unqualified failure. Contradictory
information is the currency of the day. Consider just a few of the reported
facts and opinions: The welfare rolls have been dramatically reduced, 19 with a
26 percent reduction nationwide, and state officials are confident that "most"
of the welfare recipients will replace lost benefits with earnings from
21 22employment. Or, the hopes of welfare officials are artificial. We are
meeting our goals, with many welfare recipients obtaining meaningful jobs.23
Or, we are meeting our goals only in those few states willing to provide
24community service jobs, and we are not meeting our goals otherwise since
the available jobs are too low-wage for anyone to support a family.25 Or
perhaps we are not meeting our goals because the private sector will only,
provide entry-level jobs. 26 "You're going to see more women standing on the
comer" and "there's going to be more prostitution, more stealing." 27 New
strict work rules will force people into crimes, drugs, and prostitution, since
"women gonna do what they gotta do." 28 According to President Clinton, "the
debate is over," and welfare reform has worked, while Donna Shalala, his
Secretary of Health and Human Services, asserts that "the real test" of keeping
29
recipients employed is still to come.
Part of the problem lies with the media. News organizations, admittedly
often the last to know what is happening, have not yet decided on the criteria
Reform, 26 MICH. J.L. REFORM 741 (1993).
16. See, e.g., John Harris & Judith Havemann, Welfare Rolls Continue Sharp Decline. Percentage
on Assistance Is Lowest Since 1970, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1997, at Al.
17. See, e.g., Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 15, at 742-43.
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Simpson, Welfare Reform Goes to Work on Wednesday, VA.-PILOT, Sept.
28, 1997, at Al.
19. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Getting Opal Caples to Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, §6
(Magazine), at 33.
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Liz Halloran & Andrew Julien, Welfare Cutoff Looming: Many Recipients Who
Work Will Lose Cushion Saturday, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 26, 1997, at A I (quoting Joyce Thomas,
Connecticut Commissioner of Social Services) ("I feel very confident that the direction the state is going
will yield us the results we want: more people who can work.").
22. See, e.g., id.
23. See, e.g., id.; see also Paul Glastris et al., Was Reagan Right?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 20, 1997, at 30 ("[W]ith welfare cases now falling off the rolls like autumn leaves, it's becoming
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TIMES, June 30, 1997, at Al.
25. See, e.g., id.
26. See, e.g., id.
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by which to judge reform. Some newspapers emphasize the size of the welfare
rolls,30 while others concentrate on the quantity of available jobs,31 and still
others examine job quality.32 Given such divergent standards for success,
advocates on welfare reform issues have ample room to interpret the data on
the success of the most recent federal welfare reform.
Advocates themselves, however, are also to blame for elevating
ideological drama over pragmatic evidence. As both sides have disdained or
manipulated data for years, they have not come to any consensus about
whether welfare is primarily about charity or work. Charitable concern for the
disadvantaged has coexisted uncomfortably with incentives for work since the
Elizabethan Poor Laws, which were well established in Connecticut by
1650. 33 Under these laws, towns supplied food and shelter for the local poor,
but those who refused to work could lose their children or be subject to
"moderate whipping," meaning no more than ten lashes. 34 Although welfare
programs this century have been a far cry from work houses and whipping,
welfare opponents such as Charles Murray have continued to emphasize
incentives, arguing that recipients were skilled at manipulating the system and
made rational choices to maximize their benefits.35 Conservatives who agree
with Murray have not lost much sleep over the fact that social scientists, after
spending countless hours with econometric data and analysis, have failed to
substantiate the bulk of Murray's claims
36
Although substance has been missing, ideological rhetoric has continued
unabated into the most recent wave of welfare reform, reminding me of a case
I observed over twenty years ago. During the mid-1970's, in a case Edin and
Lein would appreciate, a Pennsylvania district attorney's office prosecuted its
first welfare fraud case.37 The defendant, a mother with two young children,
was accused of collecting unreported child support while receiving a full
welfare grant. Her defense was that she had reported her child support to her
social worker, a welfare department employee. She testified that the social
worker told her that she needed the money more than the state did, and further
told her not to report the extra income to the income-maintenance worker,
who was in charge of determining the size of the welfare grant. Had the
defendant advised the income-maintenance worker of the child support, her
welfare grant would have been reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis. The social
worker confirmed the defendant's testimony.
30. See, e.g., Halloran & Julien, supra note 21, at Al.
31. See, e.g., DeParle, supra note 19, at 33.
32. See, e.g., Bill Minutaglio, State Risks U.S. Fines for Not Moving More Welfare Recipients into
Work, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 1997, at 26A.
33. See, e.g., Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 761 (Conn. 1995).
34. Id.
35. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984).
36. See generally Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, J. ECON.
LITERATURE, Mar. 1992, at 1.
37. The author, who represented the defendant in unrelated civil matters, was present at these




The trial judge told me this was an open-and-shut case. The social
worker's testimony was irrelevant. The defendant knew she had to report all
outside income; she failed to do so and she had defrauded the state. He
instructed the jury consistent with this view.
The jury, however, did not cooperate. In what might be considered a jury
nullification, the defendant was acquitted. The judge did not dismiss the jury
with the usual "thank you for performing your civic duty" speech; instead he
spent a few minutes telling them how irresponsible they were.
The Pennsylvania trial presaged the modem welfare reform debate. The
defendant welfare recipient, with a degree of skill in negotiating the welfare
system, sought to maximize her resources. The judge wanted to punish this,
perhaps wanting to end the woman's dependency, or perhaps feeling that strict
interpretation of the law was more important than the obvious injustice of the
case. The social worker was an advocate for (and facilitated) supplementing
the welfare grants through child support. In that case, the jury was more
sympathetic to the recipient than to the system.
Times have changed. Twenty years later, the jury, albeit in the form of
Congress and state legislatures, no longer sympathizes with the woman.
Unfortunately, welfare reform seems to be based more on a change in
sympathies than on a reasoned analysis of empirical data.
II. A Simple Goal and the Willpower to Achieve It
Although media sources and welfare advocates continue to battle over the
appropriate goals for welfare reform, politicians from the President to state
legislators have identified the major problem as too many recipients staying
on welfare for too long.38 Given that definition of the primary problem with
welfare, most modem welfare reform is a justifiable and logical response. If
we define the problem as recipients receiving benefits for more than two
years, limiting benefits to less than two years is sure to have the desired
results. However, without placing too much emphasis on semantics, calling
this "reform" is more rhetorical than accurate. "Reform" implies not just
change, but improvement-removing faults or defects, introducing a better
method. Instead, we have changed a bad system without first identifying
precisely what was bad. It is as though we were driving the wrong way down
a one-way street. As people started yelling, pointing at one-way signs, we
made the first available turn, going the wrong way down a different one-way
street. It would have been nice if we had looked before making another turn,
instead of after.
Not surprisingly, early indications of success have become increasingly
tainted with later indications of failure. Most dramatically, the welfare-reform
heroine who graced the cover of the New York Times Magazine in 1994, had
38. See, e.g., Harris & Havemann, supra note 16, at Al; Tricia Vance, Will County's Welfare
Reform Work?: New Hanover Officials Eager to Try Out Own Experiment, WILMINGTON STAR-NEWS,
Nov. 30, 1997, at IA.
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by 1997 sunk back into depression and drug use. 39 Already, just three months
after the effect of landmark federal legislation, fewer than half of the states are
likely to meet the federal goal requiring work from 75 percent of two-parent
families on welfare. 40 Unfortunately, although politicians are quick to endorse
unrealistic solutions, they are slow to admit that pet legislation has failed.
Even though the two-parent family goals are unrealistic and not particularly
meaningful, since two-parent families represent only 7 percent of the national
welfare caseload,41 the issue has great symbolic value. President Clinton does
not want to appear soft on issues of work, and governors do not want to admit
failure in meeting the first difficult federal deadline. 42 Even the much-
trumpeted successes of welfare reform may be misattributed; a study
commissioned for the White House Council of Economic Advisors attributed
about 40 percent of the decline in welfare rolls to the strong economy, 31
percent to state waivers, and 29 percent to other factors.43
The prospects for the future may be gleaned partially from Michigan's
experience in eliminating its General Assistance program. In October 1991,
Michigan provided an average monthly General Assistance payment of $144
plus food stamps to over 80,000 adults.44 Forty-six percent of the recipients
were women.45 In October 1991, the Michigan legislature, at the initiative of
Governor John Engler, terminated the program.46 While the primary motive to
ending the program was fiscal, the governor also talked in terms of ending
"welfare dependency" by forcing "thousands of able-bodied people to find
work. 47 At the time, the unemployment rate in Michigan was 9.7 percent,
over 400,000 unemployed people.4 8 About half of the General Assistance
population had completed high school, 40 percent were over forty years old,
almost half lived in Detroit and 61 percent had never worked.49
By April 1992, less than a year after the implementation of the reforms,
the Salvation Army estimated that the cuts had increased homelessness in
Detroit by about 30 percent.50 The head of the Wayne County Department of
Social Services estimated the increase in homelessness at 50 percent.51
39. See Jason DeParle, Welfare to Work: A Sequel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997, §6 (Magazine), at
14.
40. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Half the States Unlikely to Meet Goals on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 1997, at A 1; Linda Feldmann, Welfare Rolls Fall Far, but Snags Loom, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 18, 1997, at 1; Judith Havemann, Beginning of Welfare's End, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept.
21, 1997, at IC.
41. See Feldmann, supra note 40, at 1.
42. See id.
43. See Harris & Havemann, supra note 16, at Al,
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In 1993, two years after benefits were stopped, a study by the University
of Michigan School of Social Work found that only 20 percent of the former
General Assistance recipients were fully self-supporting. 52 Thirty percent
relied on other forms of governmental subsidies, primarily disability
benefits. 53 Seventeen percent worked in odd jobs, such as raking leaves or
collecting cans.5 4 Sixteen percent received help from friends or family. 5 Four
percent received unemployment insurance, workers compensation, or private
pensions.5 6 Twelve percent had no observable cash support of any kind.5 ' The
termination of the General Assistance program had put a greater burden on the
federal government through the social security system and on the City of
Detroit, as the homeless population grew dramatically.5 8 As the state saved
money on General Assistance, it spent more for emergency shelters.59 In 1992,
the year following the cuts, Detroit reported a 103 percent increase in demand
for emergency shelter.60 Most of the former recipients-poorly educated, in
poor health, and relatively old-were simply poor candidates for full-time
jobs. 61 Critics of the Michigan plan estimated that the budget savings of $240
million would be wiped out if only 10 percent of the General Assistance
62population wound up in prisons or mental hospitals.
The Michigan results are not an anomaly. Nationwide, the early signs are
not good for those with the least resources. In December 1997, the Conference
of Mayors reported that a survey of twenty-nine cities showed that requests
for emergency food grew by 16 percent and emergency shelter by 3 percent in
1997.63 The increase in food requests was the largest since 1992; the increase
in shelter requests was the smallest in the survey's thirteen-year history.
64
According to officials in St. Paul, Minnesota, the housing increase is lower
because admission criteria to shelters have been tightened and "the word is out
that emergency shelter is not an option that a needy person can depend on."
65
While most of us would agree that housing and feeding people through
mental health or prison systems is not what we mean by welfare reform,
legislators seem all too willing to make broad pronouncements based on little
or no data, content with shifting people from one category to another and then
bragging about squeezing the balloon (while ignoring the bulge on the other









60. See Sandra D. Hauser, Letter to the Editor, Experience Says Welfare Cuts Lead to Poverty,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at A14.
61. See Purnick, supra note 52, at B3.
62. See DeParle, supra note 50, at Al.
63. See Calls Rising for Food and Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A 16.
64. See id.
65. Id.
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side). It reminds me of a friend who, after ten years as a legal-services lawyer,
said that when he started his goal was to end poverty; ten years later, he was
content to move poverty to the next county.
III. Edin and Lein's Findings
By contrast, Making Ends Meet attempts to provide hard data on which to
base decisions. The authors provide a wealth of information, examining the
lives of welfare mothers at a depth well beyond other studies.
As a starting point, Making Ends Meet challenges our basic assumption
about the manner in which welfare recipients make financial decisions.
According to Edin and Lein, welfare recipients look at the economics of
welfare grants from a different perspective than welfare advocates or critics.
While reformers tend to examine the size of welfare grants from a purely
economic viewpoint, many welfare recipients consider parenting to be equally
or more important. When there is a conflict between parenting and finances,
recipients may make decisions that conflict with careful budgeting. From an
economic viewpoint, purchasing name-brand sneakers for fifty dollars may
seem foolish. Recipients explain the expenditure as a way of keeping their
children out of gangs or criminal activity, which would be alternative ways of
acquiring the same sneakers. 66 Similarly, recipients believe that their children
need occasional treats, like trips to McDonald's, even if those trips exceed the
monthly budget.67
A. How These Mothers Survive
Of the 214 welfare-reliant mothers Edin and Lein interviewed, only one
managed on welfare benefits alone.68 After paying for housing and food, the
typical family had $90 per month left for all other expenses, including
clothing, transportation, laundry, school supplies, furniture, over-the-counter
medicines and toiletries, haircuts, telephone calls, diapers, and incidentals.
69
The only recipient who met her expenses with welfare benefits (i.e., the
only one of the sample of 214 who was in compliance with welfare law)
reportedly spent nothing on entertainment, alcohol, cigarettes, child care,
school supplies, furniture, or transportation, and nothing for Christmas,
birthdays, or any other special occasions. Her child often went hungry, lacked
adequate winter clothing and had frequent absences from school. This model
welfare mom was reported to child protective services for neglect by several
of her neighbors.7 v
How, then, do these mothers survive? In the case of welfare-reliant
mothers, the authors found the fears of conservatives and liberals (as
66. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 1, at 26.
67. See id. at 30.
68. See id. at 42.
69. See id. at 40.
70. See id. at 38-39.
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hypothesized by Christopher Jencks) 71 to be well founded: welfare mothers
have unreported income. For example, the one-eighth of Edin and Lein's
sample that came within $50 per month of covering expenses did so to a
person by receiving subsidized housing or sharing housing costs with friends
or relatives. 72 Half of this group received in-kind assistance from community
organizations, family, and friends; and half sold food stamps for cash and
purchased necessities from neighborhood fences at cut-rate prices.73 Without
these strategies, the authors estimate that the mothers would have spent an
additional $200-300 a month to keep their families together. 74 Thus, since
welfare recipients cannot support their families on welfare grants, they find
alternative and unreported sources of income, including work, child support,
and regular and irregular support from other family members. 75 On the
average, welfare payments, food stamps and Supplemental Security Income
payments covered approximately 60 percent of welfare-reliant mothers'
expenses.76 Earnings from work made up 15 percent of welfare-reliant
mothers' total monthly income, with 17 percent coming from unreported gifts,
and another 4 percent from agency-based contributions. 77 Seventy-seven
percent received unreported contributions from their personal networks, with
over half receiving help from a boyfriend or the father of their children.
Thirty-one percent received direct assistance from a community group.78
Wage-reliant mothers, according to Edin and Lein, take pretty much the
same approach. On the whole, low-wage working mothers met roughly two
thirds of their needs with their official income. 79 None of the 165 wage-reliant
mothers paid her expenses through her earnings.80 On the average, after
paying for shelter, food, transportation, and child care, a wage-reliant mother
was $8 short each month, before any consideration of clothing, laundry,
cleaning supplies, school supplies, furniture, health care, hair cuts, telephone
bills, diapers, and dental care. 8' Wage-reliant mothers depended on assistance
from parents or boyfriends, overtime work, a second job, or help from a social
service agency82 With an average of only 63 percent of monthly expenses
covered by earnings from a main job, the mothers relied heavily on other legal
and illegal work (7 percent of total monthly income), family and friends (5
percent), boyfriends (5 percent), absent fathers (10 percent) and cash vouchers
from agencies (3 percent).8 3
71. See Jencks, supra note 7, at xii.
72. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 1, at 41.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 42.
75. See id. at 38-39.
76. See id. at 43.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 90.
80. See id. at 106.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 106-07.
83. See id. at 106-09.
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Forty-six percent of the welfare-reliant mothers and 39 percent of the
working mothers took side jobs adding, respectively, $276 and $227 per
month . The mothers reported enjoying the jobs, but found it hard to stay at
reported work due to the heavy tax on earnings through reduction of various
means-tested welfare benefits.
8 5
As a result, only 5 percent of the welfare recipients reported this work to
the welfare department, and most of those only after they were caught by their
case workers and forced to do so.86 Those welfare-reliant mothers reporting
their work earned an average of $399 a month through limited, uncertain, and
often seasonal hours, generally at minimum wage.8 7 Forty percent of the
welfare-reliant mothers who chose to work did not report their jobs at all.88 In
order to obtain off-the-books work, welfare-reliant mothers often accepted
less than minimum wage;8 9 these recipients earned $229 per month90 in jobs
such as house cleaning, baby sitting, laundry, yard work, unregistered
neighborhood taxis, cooking meals, and sewing. 91 The earnings were
unpredictable, but the income was critical.
More seriously illegal work was often eschewed, as most of the welfare-
reliant mothers felt that selling sex, drugs, and stolen goods, was not
compatible with good mothering. 92 Since main goal of almost all welfare-
reliant mothers was to keep the family together,93 and since underground work
presented the greatest danger to family unity, only 8 percent of the welfare-
reliant sample participated in underground work, even though such work was
easily available.
94
B. The Role Of Fathers And Boyfriends
Men played a critical role in helping to balance the mothers' budgets.
Over half of the welfare-reliant mothers received contributions from men
averaging $180 per month,95 while over half of the wage-reliant mothers
received cash assistance from men averaging $309 a month. 96
Contrary to some stereotypes, fathers played a significant role in this
support. One third of the welfare-reliant mothers reported receiving
contributions from absent fathers, three times what the national data on child
support reflects.97 The discrepancy is due to the large amount of unreported
84. See id. at 167.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 167-68.
87. See id. at 168.
88. See id. at 168, 172.
89. See id. at 173.
90. See id. at 172.
91. See id. at 174.
92. See id. at 176.
93. See id. at 177.
94. See id. at 176.
95. See id. at 154.
96. See id. at 150-51, 154.
97. See id. at 158-59.
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contributions, which Edin and Lein call "covert support."9 8 Deception was
common in regard to child-support authorities, with 60 percent of welfare-
reliant mothers stating that they had lied about the identity of a father or had
hidden crucial identifying information, thus making it difficult for the
authorities to collect the child support which, in turn, made it easier for fathers
to pay mothers directly.99 In addition to receiving the money, some mothers
believed that direct payment, without state intervention, would result in a
better relationship between the father and child, such as allowing the father to
provide clothing or money for special events directly. 100 The fathers, in turn,
expected more regular visitation in exchange for providing covert support.'
0
'
The mothers believed that fathers should pay voluntarily. 10 2 Although only
one third of the recipients received cash from absent fathers, another third
received regular in-kind assistance, like diapers, shoes, school clothes, or
birthday and Christmas presents.'0 3 Occasionally, they would also purchase
non-essential items like video cassette recorders and electric games for the
children. °4 As a dramatic indictment of the government's child support
collection system, welfare-reliant mothers receiving covert support were more
successful than the government, by $141 to $121 per month. l'0 Of the $121
per month, welfare-reliant mothers who cooperated with the system received
an average of $46 per month, the rest going to "repay" the welfare grant.'
0 6
Forty-two percent of the wage-reliant mothers received contributions from
absent fathers, compared to 33 percent of welfare-reliant mothers. 1°7 The big
difference, however, was that the working mothers received an average of
$300 per month. The authors found that fathers' contributions decreased as the
children aged.1
0 8
For conservatives opposed to single-parent child-rearing, the existence of
these illegal relationships may be frustrating. At least these men, however,
fathered the children involved. In many cases, support came from
"boyfriends," defined by the authors as men who had an ongoing romantic
relationship with the mother but were not legally married to her and were not
the father of any of her children. Boyfriends contributed financially to 29
percent of both welfare- and wage-reliant mothers, averaging $195 per
month. 1°9 A boyfriend seldom stayed in the home unless he contributed cash
and in-kind goods to the household; 10 as many mothers told Edin and Lein,
98. Id. at 159.
99. See id. at 160.
100.Seeid. at 161.
101 .See id.
102.See id. at 162.
103.See id. at 162-63.
104.See id. at 164.
105.See id. at 165.
106.See id.
107. See id.
108.See id. at 166.
109.See id. at 154-55.
110.Seeid. at 155.
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men who "don't pay, can't stay.""' The need for steady income and the
erratic nature of the contributions of boyfriends created what some mothers
called "serial boyfriends." 112 The boyfriends were provided with a place to
stay, occasional meals, and the opportunity to serve as a surrogate father for
the children. Many of the boyfriends had been cut off from their own
biological children that they failed to support."13
Whether welfare reform weakens these relationships or strengthens them
remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that these relationships were not
-always positive. In many cases, the mothers had to choose between danger
and destitution, since many men brought domestic violence, drugs, alcohol,
undesirable companions, and illegal activity into the mothers' homes."
14
According to Randy Albeda, associate professor of economics at the
University of Massachusetts at Boston, 20 percent of all welfare recipients
have been victims of domestic violence within the past 12 months, and two
thirds have been abused by a husband or boyfriend during their adult lives." 5
He argues that "[t]he limited choices and terms of welfare reform will likely
mean that many women choose to return to an abusive situation to make ends
meet."
1 16
C. Welfare Imposes Serious Hardships, but Low- Wage Work is Worse
Welfare-reliant families undergo serious material hardship. With the
exception of Boston, one third of the families interviewed ran out of food
during the previous twelve months. 117 Fifteen percent of the families went
hungry, with the rest negotiating food from food pantries or from family and
friends. 118 If the sample is representative, this translates to roughly two
million children going hungry sometime during each year." 9 Twelve percent
of the mothers kept their children home from school during cold weather
because of a lack of adequate winter clothing. 12 Approximately one third of
the families had their telephone disconnected or were without telephone
service entirely during the previous year. 121 Seventeen percent had electricity
or gas shut off during the past year. Between 5 percent and 9 percent of the
families in each city had not seen a doctor for necessary medical care due to
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care. 124 One third of the children lived in poor-quality housing. 125 Sixteen
percent of the families had experienced homelessness during the preceding
twenty four months (including stays in shelters, abandoned buildings, or with
relatives without a long-term place to stay).126 One fourth of the families
doubled up in housing with a friend or relative for financial reasons. 27
Perhaps the most surprising finding is that working mothers experienced
more hardship than welfare-reliant mothers.' 28 Although working mothers
spent. significantly more than welfare-reliant mothers on housing, medical
care, clothing, transportation, child care, school supplies, and miscellaneous
expenses, 29 their expenses were also higher. Most such families faced
shortages in food (24 percent), 30 winter clothing (15 percent), telephone
disconnection (over 33 percent), financial inability to see a doctor when
necessary (33 to 50 percent), lack of medical insurance (20 percent), housing-
quality problems (25 percent), eviction for non-payment of rent (8 percent),
homelessness during the previous twelve months (12 percent), and doubling
up with a friend or relative (24 percent).' 3'
D. Welfare As A Rational Choice
Making Ends Meet supports the conservative notion that poor mothers
rationally assess the system and consider how much they would need to earn
to offset added costs of work. In considering whether to go to work or stay on
welfare, the vast majority of the sample compared prospective wages to cash
welfare and food stamp benefits; considered potential losses in means-tested
benefits such as housing subsidies; calculated the child care, medical care,
transportation, and clothing expenses necessary for work; and considered the
effect of a job on their ability to supplement their income.' In balancing the
values of welfare and work, they were risk averse with an awareness of the
potentially serious hardship discussed above.
Contrary to popular belief, however, these mothers were also savvy about
the job market. They were aware of job options, with 83 percent of the sample
having had work experience (an average of 5.6 years). In addition, in order
to stay employed, many of the mothers worked in seasonal jobs, which
required holding three or four jobs a year. The jobs were not stable and thus
subject to frequent layoffs. 134 Moreover, if they took a job and lost it, they
would be without income for some time while the welfare department
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127.See id. at 54-55.
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redetermined their eligibility. Thus, after comparing welfare to work, most of
the mothers believed that they would be worse off with a low-wage job-a
belief corroborated by Edin and Lein.' 35 The majority of the working mothers
reported that they were no better off financially as a result of working than
they were while collecting welfare. 36 Despite these difficulties, the majority
of mothers reported a greater sense of self-esteem and a great reluctance to
return to welfare. 137 Edin and Lein stress that low-wage work does not pay a
livin or family wage, and that low-wage jobs do not provide access to better
jobs.
This result prevented mothers from working despite their strong desire to
do so. A large majority (86 percent) of the sample claimed that they planned
to leave welfare for work, but 73 percent stated that they could not afford to
accept the jobs available.' 39 The mothers who felt able to work immediately
had more education and work experience than the rest of the sample, and their
children were either older, or could stay with friends or relatives for child
care. 14 Two thirds of those planning to leave welfare for work could not do so
because of a lack of access to low-cost child care. 141 Even those who did want
to work immediately sought wages of $8-10 per hour within two years, but
jobs in that range were not generally available. Although the welfare system
would subsidize the cost of child care for a year, the mothers doubted they
would be able to assume the full cost after the subsidy had lapsed.
43
While many AFDC recipients also worked, Edin and Lein's sample of
working mothers excluded those receiving cash benefits. Many did, however,
receive food stamps, housing subsidies, and Medicaid. 44 As Edin and Lein
point out, receipt of these subsidies is a mixed blessing, as each of the
subsidies is means-based, decreasing as income increases. Put another way,
not only does the welfare recipient lose cash benefits if she works, she has the
added disincentive of increased food, housing and medical costs, not to
mention work expenses. The lost subsidies serve as a steep tax on all earnings
exceeding welfare cash benefits. For example, for those workers living in
subsidized housing, every "extra" dollar resulted in a thirty-cent increase in
rent. 146 Food stamps were also reduced with increased earnings; medical
benefits terminated for those families exceeding 133 percent of poverty.1
47
Most wage-reliant mothers were not eligible for Medicaid and did not have
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E. The Job Market, Not A Culture Of Poverty, As The Culprit
Based on their findings, Edin and Lein disagree with cultural theories of
poverty. Their results indicated that these women had to work extremely hard
to make ends meet, moved back and forth a great deal between work and
welfare, and found obstacles such as day care and lack of training
insurmountable barriers to work. While the observed behaviors differed at
different sites and with different groups, the authors argue that the strongest
conclusion from the data is that the women's behavior "reflected reasoned
calculations of which alternative would be likely to expose their children to
the least harm."' 149 Edin and Lein conclude that the most important obstacle
for these mothers is their reduced access to opportunity structures.' 50 In other
words, Edin and Lein conclude that the problem with welfare as we knew it
was not psychological dependency or deviant behavior, but a failure of the
labor market. 151
More specifically, Edin and Lein's findings cast doubt on the idea that
welfare allowed lazy mothers to avoid work, and that welfare reform will
force these women to obtain advantageous job experience and training. After
all, the majority of women in the sample had spent considerable time in the
workforce, and the vast majority of those who had worked were unable to use
that work experience to get better jobs. 152 Even those mothers who had been
working for several years remained in low-wage jobs. 53 Nor did training
provide job opportunities; 154 many of the sample who worked at unskilled or
semi-skilled jobs (cashiers, stock clerks, office clerks, nurse's aides and child
care workers), 155 were skilled workers and graduates of training programs
who could not find skilled jobs.1 6 Even the one third of the sample with
skilled jobs as secretaries, receptionists, cosmetologists, maintenance workers,
licensed health care workers, restaurant cooks, and teachers' aides, did not
earn enough to prevent the hardships described above. The women who had
experimented with short-term skills programs felt that these programs
improve their opportunities and that only two- or four-year degrees would
help their employment prospects. 57 This was a difficult proposition for work-
reliant mothers, who already faced the substantial difficulties of single
parenting and full-time work.
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F. Helping Welfare Mothers Get To Work
So how can single mothers successfully leave welfare to go to work? Edin
and Lein divide this question into three critical sub-questions: (1) How could
these women afford to work? (2) Did the working mothers experience the
same hardships that caused other single mothers to return to welfare? (3) If the
wage-reliant mothers did experience the same problems, how did they
overcome them? 158 If policy makers are able to read only a portion of this
book, they should start with the answers to these three questions. If welfare
reform is to have any chance of success, our policy must provide the type of
assistance that will allow welfare-reliant mothers to surmount these problems.
Edin and Lein found that wage-reliant mothers were able to work because
of special circumstances that reduced the added costs of work, including
having only school-aged children, receiving substantial and regular child-
support payments, paying little for rent, child care or transportation, and
having access to full health care.1 59 Ninety percent of Edin and Lein's sample
reported at least one of these special circumstances; two thirds reported two or
more, and nearly one half reported three or more. 160 For many of the mothers,
child support was the key factor. Free or reduced rent came in the form of a
housing subsidy or of living with family or friends or of living in housing
owned by family or friends. Only 5 percent of the working mothers paid
market rates for either all-day or after-school child care. 161 Family and friends
were a primary source for free or low-cost child care. Use of family members
and friends did, however, often limit the mothers' ability to find work and
sometimes resulted in limited ability to take a better job.' Summer vacations
also presented a problem for many mothers whose children attended school.
63
More generally, the availability of cash contributions from personal
networks was a critical factor in providing an opportunity to move from
welfare to work,164 as cash contributions made other survival strategies
unnecessary and allowed the mothers more time for education and training.
65
While the vast majority of the mothers sought full financial independence,
none earned enough to make this possible, and instead relied on other
strategies for survival. After work, the favored strategy was cash help from
members of their personal networks. The preference was to receive financial
assistance from their children's fathers; in the case of welfare recipients, this
required violating welfare reporting rules and evading formal child-support
procedures.' 66 The greatest source of support in the mothers' personal
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networks was, however, not their children's fathers, but their own mother,
followed by siblings and the paternal grandmother, even when the father was
absent. 67 The third best alternative was a side job, usually for cash work or in
the informal economy, which sometimes required a false ID or false social
security number. 68 The fourth best alternative was seeking help from social
service agencies or private charities, which ranked low because it was seen as
humiliating and comparable to welfare. 169 The final option was selling sex,
drugs, or stolen goods.170 Most of the mothers who reported resorting to this
last alternative moved to one of the more preferable alternatives when
possible. 171
IV. A Critique of Edin and Lein's Methodology
A word about Edin and Lein's methodology. In order to encourage
recipients to talk with them, Edin and Lein followed a methodology Edin
developed while working for ChrisLopher Jencks as a graduate student at
Northwestern University. After finding reluctance on the part of welfare
recipients to speak with her, she asked people working with welfare recipients
to introduce her to the recipients, who in turn would introduce her to other
recipients. Edin and Lein used this technique in studies in Chicago, Boston,
Charleston and San Antonio.
172
Jencks notes that the result was that "they over-sampled people with a lot
of friends, especially friends on welfare or with low wage jobs," but adds that
"there is no obvious reason why that fact should distort conclusions about
single mothers' budgets."' 73 I am not so sure. While Christopher Jencks (and
Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein) know much more than I do about methodology
of this sort, I believe that this particular methodology tends to identify a peer
group that emphasizes competence and is not necessarily representative of all
welfare recipients.
For the last twenty five years, the large majority of my clients in a high-
volume law practice have been welfare recipients. If I were asked to introduce
Edin and Lein to one of my clients, the pool would be limited to those clients
who were willing to meet with Edin and Lein. I would tend to think of clients
who were more verbal, had chosen to speak about welfare issues and were
willing to share their stories, perhaps someone who had testified before the
state legislature or had talked with the press. Their references, in turn, would
likely be their friends or acquaintances with similar experiences. The sample
is not random and, in all likelihood, identifies a disproportionate number of
the most competent and highest skilled members of the overall pool.
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Whether the pool is representative or not has a dramatic effect on Edin
and Lein's findings. If Edin and Lein's sample is representative, their findings
cannot be reconciled with William Julius Wilson's views on the disappearance
of work, work skills, and the resulting culture of poverty in the inner-cities. 174
Wilson argues that the lack of attachment to the formal job market has drastic
consequences.175 The formal economy is characterized by regularity and
discipline, which provides the framework for daily behavior. In a low-
employment neighborhood, the overall effect is a heightened sense of self-
doubt, of the ability to achieve social goals, decreased motivation, and an
increased willingness to accept welfare as a legitimate alternative to work.
176
(Wilson cites an unpublished paper by Kathryn Edin, with findings similar to
Making Ends Meet, for the proposition that many women make rational
decisions to choose welfare over low-wage jobs.)177
On the other hand, if Edin and Lein's sample is not representative, their
conclusions may be consistent with Wilson's culture of poverty. Wilson
emphasizes jobs as the means by which poor people learn life skills while they
earn their livelihood. Edin and Lein conclude that women in their sample,
most of which has worked, have developed those skills. Given Wilson's
citation of Edin as evidence that the culture of poverty is not universal, this
reconciliation is not a stretch. However, while this does not diminish the value
of Edin and Lein's findings as to those recipients who possess the necessary
job skills, it does bring into question the universality of their conclusions. To
the extent a culture of poverty does exist, Edin and Lein's conclusions do not
apply to those who have not worked and do not have work skills.
In addition, Edin is a particularly empathetic interviewer. Her children
play with her subjects' children. In her interviews she consciously identifies
with the interviewee. She has been quoted as saying, "I've always just felt an
overwhelming affinity with the people I interview. I always felt, 'Wow,
they're not that much different from me."",178
Well, yes and no. As a clinical teacher, I believe in and encourage passion
on behalf of clients. 179 There is nothing surprising about an advocate
identifying with her clients' cause. Edin's identification, however, presents
two problems. First, Edin and Lein are studying, not representing the members
of their pool. Second, the notion that the subjects are "not that much different"
from Edin (or Lein) is just not true. No matter how much I identify with my
clients, I am always conscious that I am male, white, middle class, employed,
mobile and highly educated. Most important, I know that no matter how much
time I spend in a housing project or shelter, where I might be the only white
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person, I go home at the end of the day to my safe neighborhood, with modem
conveniences and food on the shelves. In a clinical setting, even as we
encourage compassion toward our clients, we talk about difference as well.
Why is it that our clients miss so many appointments? Why are some clients
late for court appearances, no matter how important?
Peter Rossi's study of homelessness in Chicago found that "almost all"
the homeless in the study were eligible for General Assistance and substantial
minorities were eligible for one or another benefit program.' 80 Yet, only
twenty-two percent received General Assistance payments and fewer than
seven percent received Supplemental Security Income. 181 Ninety-six percent
of the Chicago Homeless eligible for AFDC payments had applied, but only
seven percent were receiving benefits. By "an overwhelming" proportion,
those eligible that were not receiving benefits had been denied or terminated
for "technical" violations like failing to appear at appointments or failing to
register.'8 2 Those statistics sound much more like Wilson's culture of poverty
than Edin and Lein's work-ready sample. Moreover, the failure or inability to
negotiate bureaucracies is a dramatic difference between the Edin and Lein
and the Rossi pools.
The implications of difference, and the failure to recognize difference, are
most dramatic in Edin and Lein's subjective interpretation of welfare-reliant
mothers' expenditures. While we might accept the expenditure of $50 for
children's sneakers as a parenting and not an economic decision, *1 3 many of
us react differently to the expenditure of $22 per month for cigarettes and
alcohol.'8 4 Edin and Lein do not discuss expenditures of this sort as a question
of personal responsibility, but more as an issue of self-respect. 1
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What does all this mean? Ultimately, there is good news and bad news.
The good news is that Edin and Lein's sample, even if it does not represent
the entire welfare-reliant population, differs from popular stereotypes in
positive ways. If Edin and Lein are right, many welfare-reliant mothers have
greater skills, more ambition, and engage in more long-term planning than
commonly thought. If welfare mothers are prevented from working by
identifiable impediments like inadequate subsidies for long-term education
and training, inadequate child care subsidies and discouraging direct child-
support payments, then we could construct a successful policy by removing
these obstacles.
V. Implications for the Future
The bad news is that we have gone in the opposite direction, instituting a
policy based almost solely on "personal responsibility," which seems to be
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based on running the obstacle course as a rite of passage. If, however, future
changes in welfare policy are geared toward removing obstacles to allow more
people to move from welfare to work, Edin and Lein have shown us where to
direct our resources.
In a period of welfare contraction in the name of reform, the Wisconsin
experiment is a notable exception. Like other states, Wisconsin has
emphasized work as a substitute for welfare. Wisconsin's program, however,
has incorporated increased access to child care, health care and state-funded
jobs. Before the institution of this program, Wisconsin spent about $9,700 for
each welfare family. In 1997, the first year of the new program, Wisconsin
will spend about $15,700 per family, an increase of 62 percent.' 86 Wisconsin
may prove to be the most interesting laboratory for future charges in welfare
law.
We can safely assume that both Congress and state legislatures will
continue to tinker with welfare reform, adjusting perceived inadequacies,
adding or eliminating programs, and earmarking funds for specific purposes.
While Making Ends Meet may have its flaws, it is still a wonderful addition to
our body of knowledge of welfare recipients and ways to move a greater
percentage of the population from welfare to work. I would be more
comfortable about future legislation if I knew our federal and state legislators
were reading this book. Perhaps they will.
186.See DeParle, supra note 19, at 33.
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